RAF Regiment - Post War Years

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Royal Air Force Regiment Post War Years

40/70 gun detachment 1970

Another innovation was the establishment of RAF Regiment NCOs and airmen on the strength of squadrons of the short-range transport force. These gunners played a valuable role in carrying out many routine tasks in the helicopter and light transport squadrons as well as providing their own ground defence expertise when the aircraft were deployed in the field. Later, when side-mounted machine guns were carried by helicopters, these were often manned by the Regiment gunners in the squadrons. Similar RAF Regiment detachments were established on Harrier squadrons and the gunners soon became as adept as those in other flying squadrons at refuelling and rearming their aircraft as well as providing the close defence of the sites when deployed in the field.

Although the strengthening of links with flying squadrons was both welcome and important for the Regiment, there were disadvantages in that there was no Regiment officer in charge and training standards were prone to be the first casualty of misemployment on a variety of non-professional tasks. These were not new problems — they had first arisen in the western desert in 1942, and had reappeared on numerous occasions thereafter when the usefulness and versatility of the Regiment gunner proved irresistible to officers of other branches.

Confrontation in the Far East

The formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1962 encouraged the Republic of Indonesia to adopt an aggressive attitude towards the newly independent states with the aim of expanding its territory particularly at the expense of Eastern Malaysia, which shared a common land frontier with Indonesian Borneo.

An urgent reappraisal of requirements for the defence of Malaysia against Indonesian “confrontation” resulted in the conversion of 1 and 63 Squadrons to the LAA role and their reinforcement by 26 LAA Squadron from Cyprus. 15 Squadron, which remained a field squadron, had already been involved in the operations which quelled an attempted coup d’etat in the neighbouring state of Brunei.

1, 26 and 63 LAA Squadrons were deployed at Far East Air Force’s major airfields on Singapore Island and near Penang where RAF fighter and bomber squadrons, reinforced from the UK, were at readiness to counter any hostile moves by the Indonesian Air Force. Such was the concentration of aircraft on these airfields that the existing 12 gun defence at each was insufficient to protect all the aircraft dispersals and other vulnerable points. Reinforcements were therefore necessary from outside the theatre and two Royal Artillery Light Air Defence batteries arrived from Germany to join the defences of Changi and Tengah, on Singapore Island, while a Royal Australian Artillery LAA battery was deployed with 1 Squadron at Butterworth, opposite Penang.

The joint LAA defences at each station were fully integrated under the local RAF Regiment commander and all guns were ready for action from September 1964 to August 1966— a period of almost two years when the gun detachments, and their observation posts, some of which were sited on offshore islands, — lived in the field with their equipments and were at readiness from dawn to dusk for seven days a week. There is little doubt that the deterrent presented by a powerful multi-role Air Force operating from such secure bases was instrumental in discouraging the Indonesians from any serious military adventure against Western Malaysia.

The situation was rather different in Eastern Malaysia, where the border with Indonesia ran through a thousand miles of jungle from Tawau in the north to Kuching in the south. There were no LAA squadrons available to defend the RAF’s airheads at Labuan, Kuching and Tawau and — once again — improvisation was the only solution. Surplus 20mm Oerlikon guns were acquired from the Royal Navy’s stocks in the Singapore Naval Base and RAF Regiment NCOs were trained in their use. They completed their crash training courses by carrying out live firing practices at sea from RAF marine craft.

The instructors and the guns were then airlifted to Borneo where station personnel were trained to use them in an emergency. Such were the anti-aircraft defences deployed on the vital Borneo airfields against an attack by the Indonesian Air Force.

In the depths of the Borneo jungle the British, Malaysian and Gurkha battalions played a cat-and-mouse game with their Indonesian opponents. Air support for the Army was essential and the RAF helicopter force was continually engaged in operations from remote forward sites. 15 Field Squadron, based at Seletar on Singapore Island, maintained a constant presence on jungle airstrips, such as Sepulot, along the Indonesian border and their 3” mortars were often employed in defensive fire tasks against Indonesian infiltrators.

The effectiveness of the field squadron’s role was described in a letter from one of the helicopter squadron commanders to the officer commanding 15 Squadron: “1 would like you to know how much the efforts of your men are appreciated by the helicopter detachments on forward LZs. Apart from their primary tasks of manning the helicopter machine guns and defending the forward sites from ground attack, they have assisted with the day-to-day administration to such an extent that the helicopter crews have been able to devote all their time to achieving maximum aircraft serviceability.”

But there was a price to pay:

The permanent employment of four Regiment squadrons in the Far East put an immense strain on the remaining squadrons in the UK and Middle East which were almost continually deployed on a series of emergency deployments. Unaccompanied detachments were the norm — even in the Far East the Regiment gunners saw little of their families who were living there — and the stress of only four-month breaks in the UK between unaccompanied 12-month tours overseas discouraged an increasing number of NCOs and airmen from re-engaging when their service expired.

This loss of experience and manpower was not easy to replace at a time when recruiting for the all-regular Services was generally poor. Manning levels had declined to less than 240 officers and 2,000 gunners and it was becoming increasingly difficult to meet the growing demands for Regiment forces. How different it all might have been had the RAF Regiment (Malaya) survived to undertake the LAA defence of the airfields in Malaya and Singapore as well as being able to provide well-trained and experienced squadrons for jungle operations in Borneo.

Extract taken from "Through Adversity" by Kingsley M Oliver with kind permission from the author Kingsley M Oliver

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Post War Years

The international situation was such that defence policies had to operate at two or more levels: beneath the confrontation between the superpowers which occupied much of diplomatic and military time there were the recurring threats of insurgency, terrorism and minor wars in those areas where the RAF was based, or to which it was deployed in furtherance of HMG’s foreign policies. It was therefore inevitable that the defence structures decided upon in Whitehall were not always the most appropriate ones to deal with the actions taken by the Queen’s enemies who were intent on pursuing their own agendas, both in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.

Before long the call for RAF Regiment squadrons was heard again: the resurgence of IRA activity in Northern Ireland created threats to the RAF presence in the Province and 15 and 63 Squadrons, followed by 48 and 194 Squadrons, were deployed to RAF Aldergrove and RAF Ballykelly for security and defence duties. The internal security situation in Cyprus then demanded Regiment reinforcements and 63 and 194 Squadrons were redeployed to Cyprus while 16 Squadron was sent to Northern Ireland to fill the gap caused by another unforeseen contingency.

It was now clear that most of the very much smaller RAF Regiment front line would have to be based in the UK, and deployed overseas to meet emergencies as they arose, rather than by stationing squadrons in overseas theatres. 33 Wing HQ was subsequently based at RAF Felixstowe, with the Strategic Reserve squadrons, to meet these commitments. The Northern Ireland task continued to be met by squadron roulements but in 1959 48 Squadron had to be flown from the UK to the RAF staging post at Gan in the Maldives to deal with an internal security situation until an RAF Regiment presence could be re-established in the Far East.

In order to maximise the effectiveness of the resources of the rifle squadrons, these units were given new scales of MT, radio equipment and light machine guns. Thus instead of relying on 15- cwt and 3-ton trucks for transport, the rifle flights were equipped with Landrovers and radios down to section level, enabling them to operate more flexibly and deploy more rapidly with greater mobility. This reorganisation was marked by reviving the tide “Field” for the new squadrons, to distinguish them from their former “Rifle” organisation. In fact, the use of “Field” to describe what was still a “Rifle” structure was a misapplication of the term first used during the war.

Field squadrons were the original multi-role units, with an armoured car flight as well as a heavy weapons flight — which sometimes included artillery. It was not until Regiment squadrons were re-equipped with CVR(T) in the 1980s that the description “Field” could properly be used again but they were named “Light Armoured” squadrons instead. Today’s “Field” squadrons — with three rifle flights and a medium mortar flight- are more correctly “Rifle” squadrons in the traditional Regiment pattern.

1 and 2 Squadrons were again in the Middle East: 1, which had been among the squadrons disbanded in Germany, was revived by transferring its number to 62 Squadron at RAF El Adem. In 1959 the squadron received its Standard from Air Marshal Sir Hugh Constantine who, as a junior officer, had served in 1 Armoured Car Company before the war. 2 Squadron had been redeployed from Cyprus to Malta in the same year and received its Standard from Air Chief Marshal Sir Hubert Patch at RAF Luqa. These were the first two Standards to be awarded to RAF Regiment squadrons in recognition of 25 years distinguished service — although in both these cases most of that service was as armoured car companies, which had not been part of the RAF Regiment.

The loss of the RAF Regiment (Malaya) squadrons left no alternative to the long-deferred deployment of RAF Regiment squadrons to the Far East. 1, 15 and 63 Field Squadrons were deployed to FEAF and stationed at Butterworth, Changi and Tengah respectively — in time to take over the Gan roulement from the UK- based 48 Squadron.

On 1st November 1960 The Queen’s Colour Squadron of the Royal Air Force had been formed at RAF Uxbridge as an RAF unit with responsibility for RAF ceremonial duties. Manned by Regiment officers and airmen, it was controlled by P1 (Ceremonial) in the Air Ministry, and not by the RAF Regiment staff, although it was to have a war role as an RAF Regiment field squadron, despite its lack of training and equipment for that task.

More New Tasks for the Regiment

The attempt to maintain a post-war parachute squadron, which had collapsed in 1949, was revived on a firmer basis in 1962 when the Regiment was authorised to have a parachute capability and 2 Squadron was selected for that role. Selection was carried out by the Army’s “P” Company, which was not necessarily the most appropriate system for the RAF Regiment’s purpose. “F’ Company was designed to eliminate as many candidates as possible from the large number of Army volunteers for the Airborne Forces. On the other hand, the Regiment requirement was to bring as many volunteers as possible — from a much smaller pool of eligible personnel — to the necessary standard for service in a parachute-trained squadron. The muddled thinking which confused this issue resulted in keeping 2 Squadron under-manned, and therefore with a reduced operational capability, until — eventually — a more appropriate system of selection and training under RAF control was instituted.

In the Middle East, and later the Far East, theatre parachute teams were established for emergency operations and these were almost entirely manned by RAF Regiment officers and airmen. This was invaluable in extending the parachuting ethos more widely throughout the Regiment and in creating a pool of experienced parachutists who were available for this role in the UK and overseas.

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